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1. Is the determination of whether return of property 
seized at the time of an arrest to the criminal defendant under 
Section 77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) criminal in nature? 
2. Did the operation of Section 77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended) which provides for the return of property seized 
but not needed as evidence deprive Appellant of due process 
protections? 
3. Did the trial court rule on insufficent evidence in 
denying Appellant's Motion to Compel the Return of the Property 
under §77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)? 
4. Did the operation of §77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to Appellant? 
v. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26 (b)(2) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2(e) (1953 as amended), whereby the defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal from an order made 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. In this case, 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, issued an order affecting 
the substantial rights of Defendant/Appellant on May 12, 1987. 
vi. 
TEXT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §77-24-2 (1953 as amended): 
77-24-2. Return of property not needed as 
evidence—Procedure. Property so obtained which is not 
needed as evidence shall be returned to the owner if he may 
lawfully possess it. When the peace officer or the agency 
by which he is employed becomes aware that the property is 
not needed the prosecuting attorney shall be so advised, 
giving a description and details of ownership. When the 
prosecuting attorney, by such notice or otherwise, becomes 
aware that the property is not needed he shall give written 
notice to the owner. Upon proof of ownership and of 
lawfulness of possession satisfactory to the prosecuting 
attorney, the prosecuting attorney shall give the owner 
written authorization which shall entitle the owner to 
receive the property from the person having custody of it. 
When property so obtained is received in evidence, it shall 
be retained by the clerk of the court last receiving it or 
shall be returned by him to the custody of the peace 
officer until all direct appeals and retrials are final, at 
which time the property shall be returned in accordance 
with this section. In the event that the prosecuting 
attorney considers it necessary to retain control over the 
evidence, in anticipation of possible collateral attacks 
upon the judgment or of use in some potential prosecution, 
he may decline to authorize return. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
vii. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
THOMAS GENE DAVIS, : Case No. 870221-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order and judgment against 
Thomas Eugene Davis denying Appellant's Motion to Compel the Return 
of Property seized from him at the time of his arrest. Charges 
against Appellant were dismissed; however, on May 12, 1987, the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered his order refusing to 
require the State to return the property to Mr. Davis. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 30, 1984, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Dave 
Bascom, an investigator with the Attorney General's office observed 
Gwendolon Hall hand what appeared to be credit cards or similar 
documents to Cindy Slagowski. Mr. Bascom followed Ms. Slagowski as 
she drove alone to the First Interstate Bank at 1955 West North 
Temple. It appeared that Ms. Slagowski was followed to the bank by 
a car containing Ms. Hall, Thomas Davis, Larry Person and Carl 
Barr. See Addendum A, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Facts 1 and 2. 
Mr. Bascom observed Ms. Slagowski issue a check in the 
amount of three hundred ninety six dollars and eighty-six cents 
($396.86) on the account of the Shade Shop. The second vehicle 
which Mr. Bascom believed contained the four individuals appeared to 
be parked in a position to observe Ms. Slagowski. None of the four 
individuals entered the bank. (See Addendum A, Facts 4 and 5). 
The four individuals did not make contact with 
Ms. Slagowski; Mr. Bascom watched Ms. Slagowski drive alone out of 
the parking lot. The second vehicle appeared to follow Ms. 
Slagowski. (See Addendum A, Facts 4 and 5). 
At approximately 4:15 p.m., Ms. Slagowski was arrested at 
710 South 200 West, attempting to cash a check. Davis, Person, Barr 
and Carter were arrested a short time later in the second vehicle at 
approximately 200 South 400 West. After Ms. Slagowski entered the 
first bank, at no time did Mr. Bascom observe contact between Ms. 
Slagowski and any occupants of the second vehicle. In addition, 
there were several minutes during which the second vehicle was not 
under surveillance. (See Addendum A, Facts 6 and 7). 
Officers searched both vehicles and all five 
individuals. They found no cash in either vehicle, thirty-three 
cents ($0.33) in the possession of Barr, three dollars and ninety-
seven cents ($3.97) in possession of Slagowski, eleven dollars and 
ninety-five cents ($11.95) in possession of Carter, one hundred 
fifty one dollars and nine cents ($151.09) in the possession of 
Person and two hundred seventy-seven dollars and thirty-eight cents 
($277.38) in the possession of Davis. (See Addendum A, Fact 8). 
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Ms. Slagowski pleaded guilty and on February 3, 1986. 
The State moved to dismiss the case against Mr. Davis and the other 
three individuals because "the witnesses who observed criminal 
activity are unable to make positive identification of said 
defendants, and that the State would not be able to meet its burden 
of proof. . . ." The Court granted the State's motion to dismiss. 
(See Addendum A, Fact 9). 
immediately after the Court dismissed the case, Mr. Davis 
requested the return of his money. No other person or entity made a 
formal claim for the funds. The prosecutor and case detective 
determined the money was no longer needed as evidence and notified 
Mr. Davis through his attorney the State would return his money upon 
"proof of ownership satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney". See 
Utah Code Ann. §77-24-2 (1953 as amended). (See Addendum A, Fact 
10) . 
Mr. Davis presented an affidavit to the prosecutor 
stating he was the lawful owner of the money on February 10, 1986. 
See Addendum A, Exhibit "A" to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. Upon advice of counsel, Mr. Davis initially declined to be 
questioned under oath as to the manner in which he had obtained the 
money. The prosecutor refused to return Mr. Davis1 money. (See 
Addendum A, Fact 12). 
Mr. Davis, by and through counsel, filed a motion to 
compel the return of such property. After argument and submission 
of memoranda, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 16, 
1986. See Addendum A, Fact 13 and Exhibit "B" to Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
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On June 19, 1986, Mr. Davis and his counsel again met 
with the prosecutor. Mr. Davis answered questions regarding the 
source of his money under oath. He testified he received most of 
the money selling property for Jack Bernel of Peddler's Pawn Shop at 
swap meets and he also received some of the money from doing 
automobile detail work for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake automobile 
paint shop. The prosecutor took the position he would refuse to 
return the money until a detective verified or refuted Mr. Davis1 
testimony. (See Addendum A). 
On July 15, 1986f the prosecutor still had not returned 
Mr. Davis1 money. At that time, Mr. Davis filed a Motion for an 
evidentiary hearing in order to compel the return of his money. 
The hearing on Mr. Davis1 motion was held on August 20, 
1986. At that time, the prosecutor refused to return the money 
because: 
a) The detective had been unable to contact the persons 
Mr. Davis1 named as sources of his funds and therefore 
could neither confirm nor refute Mr. Davis1 testimony. 
b) The prosecutor believed, based on the facts 
surrounding the forgery it was very unlikely the parties 
had time to dispose of the money received by Slagowski. 
c) The prosecutor had been told by the attorney for 
Person that Person and Barr had obtained the forged 
checks, recruited Slagowski to cash them and had given 
Slagowski half the proceeds. Person and Barr had not 
seen what Slagowski had done with her half of the 
proceeds. 
(See Addendum A, Point 19). 
The detective testified at the August 20, 1987 hearing 
that his unsuccessful efforts to contact the persons named by Davis 
as sources of the funds had only been made a few days before the 
August 20, 1987, hearing. (See Addendum A, Point 20). 
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In its conclusions, the Court determined that: 
1. An ancillary proceeding in a criminal case is the 
appropriate forum to determine whether a prosecutor 
abused his discretion in refusing to return property to a 
criminal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-24-2 (1953 as 
amended). 
2. The defendant must sustain the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the prosecutor abused 
his discretion. 
3. That Mr. Davis failed to sustain his burden of proof, 
and, 
4. Proceedings ancillary to a criminal case to determine 
whether a prosecutor abused his discretion in not 
returning property of a defendant are not the kind of 
proceeding where the state must bear the cost of 
preparing a transcript for appeal. 
(See Addendum A, Conclusions). 
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
the Court entered its order on May 12, 1987, that: 
1. Mr. Davis' Motion to Compel the Return of Property be 
denied; and, 
2. Mr. Davis' Motion to Compel the State to Bear the 
Cost of Transcribing the Record be denied. 
(See Addendum A, Order) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues the trial court erred in upholding the 
prosecutor's decision to not return money seized at the time of his 
arrest. Appellant believes the trial court had ongoing jurisdiction 
to handle the matter because it arises out of a criminal charge. 
The prosecutor's decision to keep the money once the underlying 
criminal charge was dismissed violated Appellant's due process 
rights. Furthermore, even if Mr. Davis were required to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his money was not obtained by 
illegal means, he sustained that burden. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED ONGOING CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE OF RETURN OF 
PROPERTY SEIZED DURING THE ARREST OF MR. DAVIS. 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision determined it 
had jurisdiction to review the issue of return of property seized at 
the time of Mr. Davis' arrest on criminal charges and noted the 
matter was "quasi-criminal" in nature. There is no dispute the 
trial court reviewed the matter subsequent to its jurisdiction of 
Mr. Davis on a criminal matter. The trial court reasoned the 
statutory provision in question, §77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) is found in the criminal code. Its conclusion seemed to be 
based on the logic of the legislature's decision to locate the 
statute in the Code of Criminal Procedure, thereby conferring 
jurisdiction upon the criminal court. 
As indicated in the preceding statute, §77-24-1 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended), the statute in question, §77-24-2 pertains 
only to property seized in criminal proceedings. The language of 
the preceeding section, §77-24-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
indicates the property must be seized pursuant to a search warrant 
or an arrest for any public offense. Therefore, the subject matter 
of the statute must be linked to crime. Additionally, §77-1-2 Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states, "[t]he procedure in criminal 
cases shall be as prescribed in this title, the rules of criminal 
procedure. . . ." Appellant can cite to no statutory provision in 
the Code indicating any chapter within Title 77 is anything other 
than criminal in nature and relies on the legislature's choice for 
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placement of the statute in the criminal code to support his 
position the matter is criminal. 
Courts which have found forfeiture or condemnation 
proceedings civil in nature have declared the proceedings were not 
punitive but rather were to protect the public from articles which 
might be injurious to the public. United States v. Thirty-Eight 
Cases, 99 F. Supp. 460 (CD. N.Y. 1951). The court in that case 
noted condemnation of misbranded food was for the "protection of the 
public health and to prevent deception of the purchasing public." 
Id. at 463. 
The principle announced in State v. Certain Intoxicating 
Liquors, 53 Utah 171, 177 P. 235 (Utah 1918) lends support to 
Appellant's position the proceeding is criminal, in that case, the 
Utah Supreme Court found the acquittal of the defendant in a 
municipal court on criminal charges of unlawful possession of 
liquors was no bar to a subsequent trial in the district court 
regarding forfeiture of the liquor. Although the language of the 
Court in Certain Intoxicating Liquors is not entirely clear, the 
Court stated, "the trial of this class of cases is to be conducted 
as in crminal prosecutions, . . ." Id. at 236. It would seem 
therefore, that the forfeiture proceeding was criminal in nature. 
However, unlike the case at bar, in Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 
the Court reasoned acquittal on the underlying criminal charges was 
not dispositive in the forfeiture action because the property 
involved was inherently illegal in violation of laws prohibiting the 
possession of intoxicating liquors. The Court therefore had an 
obligation to the public to dispose of the property. Money, on the 
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other hand, cannot be considered inherently illegal. Awaya v. 
Hawaii, 705 P.2d 54 at 61 (Hawaii 1985). Furthermore, the 
proceeding in Certain Intoxicating Liquors, unlike the proceeding in 
the case at bar, was "directed wholly against the liquors in the 
interest of the public, not for the purpose of subjecting the 
defendant . . . to any penalties, . . ." 177 P. at 236. In the 
present case, the public does not need to be protected from Mr. 
Davis1 possession of money. 
Additionally, unlike the situation in Certain 
Intoxicating Liquors, in the case at bar, the statute is indeed 
punitive in nature. The statute provides, ff[p]roperty so obtained 
which is not needed as evidence shall be returned to the owner if he 
may lawfully possess it." (emphasis added.) By using the term 
"lawfully" the legislature has excluded the return of property which 
is inherently illegal. For comparison see §58-37-13 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended) which declares drug paraphernalia inherently 
illegal. Forfeiture of property contemplated by §77-24-2 is 
therefore not that which is inherently deleterious, harmful or 
illegal. Any such forfeiture is therefore wholly punitive in nature 
because the legislature contemplated only lawful property in the 
statute. 
Because forfeiture of the property in the case at bar 
would be punitive, acquittal on the underlying charge ought to block 
any subsequent proceeding. Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6 
S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684 (1886). In Coffey v. United States, the 
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a civil forfeiture 
proceeding should be barred by an acquittal on the underlying 
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criminal charges. The Court found acquittal of concealing distilled 
spirits with the intent to defraud the government of tax revenue 
barred forfeiture action on the spirits, in Coffey, -the United 
States argued because the burden of proof on the underlying criminal 
charges was beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden of proof on the 
forfeiture proceeding would have been by only a preponderance of the 
evidence, it would have been possible for the United States to lose 
on the criminal proceeding and yet win on the civil proceeding. The 
government argued it should therefore be allowed to proceed. The 
Court held otherwise. The Court reasoned because the parties and 
the subject matter were the same in both proceedings and no new 
trial of the criminal matter could take place, any subsequent trial 
of the civil suit would amount to "substantially the same thing." 
Id. at 443. 
Although several courts have declined to follow the rule 
of Coffey, Coffey has never been overruled. See United States v. 
Thirty-Eight Cases, 99 F. Supp. 460 (D.C. N.Y. 1951) for a 
discussion that Coffey still governs the effect of an acquittal in a 
criminal proceeding on a subsequent forfeiture proceeding which is 
penal in nature. 
In the case at bar where the legislature has drafted a 
law lacking guidance on the matter, Appellant must additionally be 
allowed to rely on the equitable powers inherent in the trial court 
to resolve the dispute. Awaya v. Hawaii, 705 P.2d 54 (Hawaii 
1985). In Awaya, the court addressed the issue of return of 
property seized once the government no longer needed it for 
evidence, in Awaya, seizure of jewelry was found to be outside the 
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scope of the search warrant and was therefore suppressed. During 
the government's delay of filing criminal charges, the owner of the 
jewels filed a motion for return of the property. The Court found 
the motion could properly be addressed to the equity jurisdiction of 
the court. Id. at 61. 
Additionally, if Appellant were forced to proceed in a 
civil proceeding, his right to court appointed counsel would not 
attach. As an indigent he would be placed in the unfair position of 
being forced to attempt to comply with court processes and 
requirements pro se. 
Furthermore, viewing the matter from the stand point of 
judicial economy, the trial court, having disposed of the underlying 
criminal matter and familiarized itself with the case, parties and 
subject matter, is in the best position to review the prosecutor's 
decision regarding the return of the property. Finally, the seizure 
of the property and ultimate dismissal of the case against Appellant 
were both criminal proceedings. Barring clear evidence property 
seized was obtained illegally or is in any way illegal or harmful to 
the public, the trial court is in the best position to compel, in a 
criminal proceeding, the return of property no longer needed as 
evidence. 
Because the proceeding was criminal in nature, the trial 
court erred in requiring Mr. Davis to prove the source of his funds 
and in carrying out the proceeding as set forth infra. 
Furthermore, because the matter was criminal in nature, 
the trial court erred in failing to order the preparation of a 
transcript. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (1953 as amended), 
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an indigent defendant is entitled to "a first appeal of right and 
the prosecuting of other remedies before and after conviction, 
considered by the defending counsel to be in interest of 
justice. . ." . Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-32-5 (1953 as 
amended), "the expenses of printing or typewriting briefs on first 
appeals of right on behalf of an indigent defendant, as well as 
depositions and other transcripts shall be paid by the county." In 
light of the foregoing statutory provisions, should this Court 
determine that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth 
in Addendum A do not set forth an adequate factual basis from which 
to appeal, Mr. Davis respectfully requests that as an alternative 
remedy, this Court order the preparation of a transcript at State 
expense and afford Mr. Davis a further opportunity to brief this 
matter by citing such transcript. 
POINT II. THE OPERATION OF §77-24-2 UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED) DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS 
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
A. THE STATUTE VIOLATES APPELLANTfS STATE AND UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS. 
The statute in question §77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) vests authority in the prosecuting attorney to allow return 
of property seized "upon proof of ownership and of lawfulness of 
possession satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney." The statute 
is silent regarding what should be done with the property or who 
should review the matter when, as in the case at bar, the 
prosecutor's satisfaction has not been met. Likewise the statute 
provides no guidance as to what factors the prosecutor must consider 
nor what weight any facts presented by the accused must be given. 
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The statute also fails to require the state to verify or refute the 
accused's assertions regarding ownership. Further, the statute 
fails to provide for a hearing on the matter. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, "No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law, . . ." Similarly, Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Article I, §11 of the Utah Constitution provides, "every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, ..." 
Our Supreme Court has stated, lf[i Implicit in the due 
process clause of our State Constitution is that persons be afforded 
a hearing to determine their rights under the law." Gribble v. 
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). The statute in question fails to 
provide for such a hearing. 
In Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980) the 
Court announced due process safeguards of both the United States and 
the Utah Constitutions operate to protect individuals from state 
action. Appellant is such an individual needing protection from 
state action. 
Although a statute must be construed to avoid 
constitutional infirmities if possible,! the statute in question 
1
 In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah, 1981). 
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fails to meet constitutional fundamental fairness due process 
concerns. 
To meet due process safeguards, the statute must first 
clearly define the scope of permissible conduct. The Court 
considered this issue in In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981). In 
Boyer, the Court reviewed the district court's order appointing a 
guardian for a mildly retarded woman. "When state action impinges 
on fundamental rights, due process requires standards which clearly 
define the scope of permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted 
intrusion on those rights." Id. at 1087-88. 
The Court stated sufficient flexibility must be 
maintained to insure the purposes of the statute be effectuated, yet 
the language must also convey "sufficiently definite" standards. 
Id. at 1088. The Court found by applying "specific, objective 
standards for determining the ability of one to care for oneself," 
the statute could be narrowly interpreted and thus the Court avoided 
finding the statute unconstitutional. Ij3. at 1089. 
Our Supreme Court has also elaborated upon due process 
safeguards in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984). In Wells, the Court carefully examined due process 
safeguards as they related to termination of fundamental rights and 
in particular, to parental rights. By analogy to other fundamental 
rights, the Court found the proponent of legislation "must show (1) 
a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and (2) 
that the means adopted are narrowly tailored to achieve the basic 
statutory purpose." Id. at 206 citing In re Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1090. 
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None of the specific or objective standards exist in the 
grant of prosecutorial power present in the statute. Assuming the 
return of lawfully possessed property to its rightful owner is a 
legitimate state interest, the statute fails to establish narrow 
guidelines for the prosecutor to follow. The requisite specific and 
objective standards which the State would have to follow to meet due 
process concerns are lacking. It is this lack of objectivity which 
clouded the prosecutor's perception in the case at bar and which 
resulted in violation of Mr. Davis' due process rights. The 
statute vests virtually unfettered discretion in the hands of the 
prosecutor. 
B. APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE 
THE MATTER DECIDED BY A NEUTRAL PARTY. 
The statute in the case at bar provides for the return of 
property no longer needed for evidence if proof of ownership and 
lawfulness is met to the satisfaction of the prosecuting attorney. 
The statute fails to provide for review of discretion or any hearing 
by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 
2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 
26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971), the Court found a warrant issued by the 
state attorney general acting as a justice of the peace who had 
supervised police activities relating to the crime was invalid 
because it was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The 
Court found the Fourth Amendment's protection required the action of 
a neutral and detached magistrate rather than the action of one 
charged with the "enterprise of ferreting out crime." The Court 
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continued, ff[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the 
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, 
not by a policeman or government enforcement agent," Id, at 449. 
11
 [P]rosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the 
requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations—the 
'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their 
single-minded attention." Id. at 450. 
It is precisely the bias of the prosecutor's adversarial 
role which prevented him from adequately protecting Appellant's due 
process rights in the case at bar. The prosecutor in this case is 
actively engaged in the competitive enterprise of advocating his 
client's (the state) interest with zeal. Anything less would be a 
violation of his ethical responsibilities as a lawyer. His role as 
an advocate in the underlying proceedings prevented him from acting 
in the neutral and detached manner required to meet due process 
concerns. 
POINT III. APPELLANT SUSTAINED HIS BURDEN OF 
PROOF AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING HELD ON HIS MOTION 
TO COMPEL THE RETURN OF PROPERTY. 
On August 20, 1986, Judge Hanson held an evidentiary 
hearing for the purposes of determining whether the money found on 
Mr. Davis at the time of his arrest should be returned to him. 
Prior to the hearing, Mr. Davis had sworn out an affidavit for the 
prosecutor declaring he was the owner of the money and entitled its 
possession. (See Addendum A.) Mr. Davis and his attorney had met 
with the prosecutor on June 19, 1986. Under oath, Mr. Davis 
answered questions regarding the sources of the money. He indicated 
he had received some of the money for payment on auto detail work 
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for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake automobile paint shop. He further 
testified he earned most of the money through a business arrangement 
he had with Mike Garrity. He and Mr. Garrity had sold property for 
Jack Bernel of Peddler's Pawn Shop on Eighth South 200 West at swap 
meets and various other places. Mr. Davis did not account for all 
of the cash in his possession at the time of the arrest. (See 
Addendum A, Fact 16). 
Forgery detective Jerry Campbell was requested by the 
prosecutor to either verify or refute Mr. Davis1 assertions. 
However at the August 20th hearing, the Detective had neither 
verified nor refuted Mr. Davis1 assertions. No person or entity had 
placed any claim on the money other than Mr. Davis. Additionally, 
the prosecutor had been informed by counsel for Person during plea 
negotiations that Person and Barr had recruited Ms. Slagowski to 
pass the forged checks. Ms. Slagowski in return had been allowed to 
keep half of the proceeds. The check she successfully cashed was in 
the amount of $396.86. (See Addendum A, Fact 17, 19, 20). 
According to the Findings drafted by the prosecutor, the 
investigator from the Utah Attorney's General's Office initially 
observed Ms. Slawgowski in contact with four other individuals, 
including Mr. Davis before she passed the check. Mr. Davis was not 
observed to pass anything between himself and Ms. Slagowski, the two 
were only observed embracing. Although the investigator also 
observed Ms. Slawgowski leaving the bank after she cashed the check, 
and followed her to a second bank where she attempted to pass 
another check, he never observed her to have any further contact 
with Mr. Davis. 
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Section 77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states, 
"[plroperty so obtained which is not needed as evidence shall be 
returned to the owner if he may lawfully possess it." (emphasis 
added.) There is no dispute the money held by the state in the case 
at bar is not needed as evidence. The charge against Mr. Davis was 
dismissed upon motion of the State when the State indicated it could 
not prosecute Mr. Davis due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, 
the statute only authorizes the prosecutor to decline to authorize 
return of the property if the prosecutor anticipates collateral 
attacks or potential prosecution. Presumably the prosecutor in the 
case at bar has held the money because his satisfaction as to the 
ownership and lawfulness of the money has not been met. 
Appellant can cite to no Utah authority directly on point 
but relies on the following case by analogy. In Angelos v. First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983), the jury returned 
a Special Verdict which found inter alia that the embezzling dental 
assistant's husband, Russel, knew of embezzlement by Mccormick and 
received embezzled funds for which he failed to give reasonable 
consideration; and further, that Russell directed, encouraged or 
requested Mccormick to embezzle with the intent to benefit himself 
from Mccormick's wrongful conduct. Id. at 775. The trial court 
ruled the Bank had no claim against Russell, and the Bank then 
appealed. The Court found Russell was not a bona fide purchaser 
without notice and was therefore liable to the Bank for the amount 
of converted funds, in reaching its decision, the court relied upon 
the Special Verdict findings. It was clear the disputed money was 
not lawfully held by Russell. No such similar findings existed in 
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the case at bar. The money found on Mr. Davis could not be traced 
to the money Ms. Slagowski received by uttering forged checks. The 
State had no evidence the money was not obtained through lawful 
means and money is not inherently illegal. Awaya v. Hawaii. 
Additionally the State could not refute Mr. Davis1 assertions the 
money was obtained through lawful means. 
Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211 (Del. Super. 1980) is 
helpful to analysis of the present case. In Campbell the Court 
examined the issue of whether money found in an abandoned stolen 
safe and subsequently turned over to the police should be returned 
to the finder or left in the hands of the police. The Court focused 
on the pivotal issue of whether the money was stolen. As in the 
case at bar, the finder of the money, Campbell, was acquitted of 
Criminal Theft and Conspiracy charges. (Campbell had found the 
money in the abandoned and previously stolen safe and conspired with 
another to keep the money.) The Delaware statute Campbell relied on 
provided goods "allegedly used in the commission of a crime . . . 
shall be returned to the person from whom seized if such person is 
not thereafter duly convicted of the alleged crime; . . . " Id. at 
219. The Court considered Campbell's motion to return the property 
criminal in nature, but consolidated his motion with the other 
actions for summary resolution. Id. at 213, 220. The Police relied 
on another statute which authorized the Police to keep stolen money 
in the custody of the Police as against the true owner. Id. at 220. 
In deciding neither party had a sufficiently strong case 
for a summary judgment, the Court provided analysis helpful to the 
case at bar. As in the present case, the statutes pertaining to 
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return of property were drafted with the intent of improving true 
owners' chances of recovering their property. Id. at 225. The 
central issue the Court grappled with was whether the money found by 
Campbell was indeed stolen. If it were stolen, ownership would vest 
with the police. If the money found were determined not be stolen, 
the money would be disposed of according to the statute controlling 
"lost or abandoned" money and would be returned to Campbell. 
In deciding the case should go to the jury, the Court 
found the following facts insufficient as a matter of law to support 
the position of the police that the money was stolen: 
(1) Money was found in a "thieves" junkyard; 
(2) Money was found in a previously stolen safe; 
(3) Other stolen property was in the same area, 
e.g., shipped cars and other safes; 
(4) The bills were in relatively small 
denominations and were packaged in 
denominational order, i.e., $5 bills together, 
$10 bills together, etc.; 
(5) The money was found late at night; 
(6) The failure of the depositer to attempt to 
claim the full amount of money from the State 
Police; and 
(7) The large amount of money [$136,000.00] in the 
package. 
Id. at 226. 
Appellant asserts the facts surrounding his claim to the 
money in the case at bar in no way point to criminal activity. The 
State could only place him in the vicinity of where a crime was 
committed. The money was never found to be illegally possessed by 
Appellant or linked to crime. Appellant argues if the facts set 
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forth in Campbell which provided several possible associations 
between the money and criminal activity were insufficient to prove 
the money was stolen as a matter of law, then under the Utah Statute 
he has met his burden of proof in showing the money was lawfully 
obtained. 
Although the Utah statute in question provides no 
guidance on the issue of burden of proof, Appellant relies on the 
explanations set forth in Campbell v, Cochran to guide this Court. 
Under the Delaware statute, the initial burden was placed on the 
finder of the property show: (1) he was the finder of the money, 
(2) the money was in the custody of the police, and (3) that the 
true owner had neither been located nor filed a claim for the 
money. Id. at 226. The Court concluded Campbell had met the 
initial burden of proof and the dispute remaining concerned whether 
the money was stolen. The Court found the police must then show, by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the money was stolen before the 
burden of rebuttal would shift to Campbell. Id. The Court reasoned: 
The Court's conclusion is based simply on the 
mathematical probability that absent any 
consideration of the facts in a particular case it 
is more likely that found money was not stolen than 
vice versa. Rather than make the finder thereof 
prove a negative fact, i.e., that the money was not 
stolen, it is more logical and reasonable to require 
that defendant [Police] affirmatively prove the 
existence of the disputed fact. 
Id. 
Appellant can cite to no Utah authority directly on point 
regarding the sufficiency of evidence required for this statute and 
therefore asks this Court to adopt the rationale set forth in 
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Campbell v. Cochran. Applying those standards to the case at bar. 
Appellant argues he has met his initial burden of showing the money 
was not stolen by signing the affidavit of ownership and testifying 
as to how he lawfully obtained the money through employment. He 
would therefore have sustained the initial burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The State never refuted his 
testimony or in any way proved the money was illegally obtained. 
Applying the standard of Campbell, the prosecutor would 
be required to show by a preponderance of the evidence the money was 
stolen or otherwise not lawfully possessed. The prosecutor in the 
case at bar was unable to do this. The investigator was unable to 
refute Appellant's assertions the money was lawfully obtained. 
Therefore, there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law for 
the court to rule against Appellant and his due process rights were 
consequently violated. 
POINT IV, THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO APPELLANT, THEREBY DENYING 
HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The statute in question requires the owner of the 
property to prove both ownership and lawfulness of possession 
satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney before the owner is 
entitled to return of the property (§77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended)). 
It is well settled the burden of proof in criminal cases 
remains on the prosecution at all times. Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 
812 (Utah 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 254, 66 
L.Ed.2d 120 (1980). In Pierre, the Court addressed Mr. Pierre's 
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concern that the burden of proof had been unconstitutionally shifted 
to him at sentencing. In ruling against Pierre, the Court reasoned 
the defendant was simply allowed to present evidence in mitigation 
if he so desired as part of the sentencing proceeding after the 
State presented evidence. Pierre, the Court reasonsed, did not have 
to meet any burden of proof. 
In State v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984) the 
Court addressed the issue of whether the state could meet its burden 
of proving the corpus delecti of a homicide where no corpse could be 
produced. In ruling the prosecution could proceed, the Court found 
the circumstantial evidence in the case was enough to sustain the 
State on Rebeterano's challenge of insufficent evidence. The Court 
did note, however, the prosecution's burden in such a case is a 
heavy one. Id. at 1267. 
Appellant's case differs significantly from both Pierre 
and Rebeterano in that the statute places the burden on him to prove 
both ownership and lawfulness of possession without first requiring 
the state to meet an initial burden of proof that the money was 
either not owned by Appellant or not lawfully possessed by him. 
Such a shift in the burden of proof violates Appellant's 
constitutional due process rights and abrogates principles set forth 
in Pierre and Rebeterano. The trial court's decision should 
therefore be reversed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's decision to 
not return money seized at the time of his arrest. He further asks 
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this case be remanded to the trial court with an order that the 
trial court order the return of Mr. Davis' property. 
DATED this day of November, 1987. 
<T-"ELIZABETH B0WWAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH BOWMAN, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four 
copies to James Housley, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84115 this <^>U day of November, 1987. 
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IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
V. 
CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI. 
GWENDOLON CARTER HALL. 
THOMAS EUGENE DAVIS. 
CARL LINDELL BARR and 
LARRY DARWIN PERSON. 
Defendants. 
: FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT DAVIS* MOTION 
TO COMPEL RETURN OF PROPERTY 
Case NO. CR 84-1483 
Hon. Judge Timothy R. Hansen 
Defendant Thomas Eugene Davis1 Motion to Compel the 
Return of Property, to-wit: $277.38 in cash seized from said 
Davis at the time of his arrest, came on regularly for hearing 
on the 7th day of November. 1986. before the Honorable Philip 
R. Fishier. Judge. Defendant Davis being present and 
represented by his Counsel. Jo Carol Nesset-Sale. and the State 
being represented by Walter A. Ellett. Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney, and the parties having presented their evidence and 
arguments and the Court being fully advised, enters its: 
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FINDINGS 
1. That on October 30. 1984. at approximately 3:45 p.m.. 
David Bascom. an investigator for the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, personally observed Cindy Slagowski (true name Becky 
Turner, hereafter "Turner"). Thomas Eugene Davis (hereafter 
"Davis"), Larry Darwin Person (hereafter "Person"). Carl 
Lindell Barr (hereafter "Barr"), and Gwendolen Carter Hall 
(hereafter "Hall"), conversing with each other and moving 
around and about two motor vehicles parked in a parking lot at 
715 West North Temple; 
2. That said Bascom observed said Davis and said Turner 
embracing and kissing and observed said Hall inside one of the 
vehicles shuffling papers that appeared to be credit cards or 
similar documents, and saw said Hall hand some of the said 
papers to said Turner; and 
3. That said Bascom continued to observe said 
individuals and observed Turner enter one vehicle and drive to 
First Interstate Bank. 1955 West North Temple, with the other 
four individuals in the second car following; 
4. That at approximately 4:00 p.m. on said date, said 
Turner cashed a forged check in the amount of $396.85 at said 
bank, and received $396.86 in payment therefor, and that the 
other four individuals remained outside in the second vehicle; 
and 
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5. That said Bascora observed the first vehicle, being 
driven by said Turner, drive out of the parking lot of said 
bank and travel eastbound on North Temple, followed by the 
second vehicle, containing the other four individuals, 
following; 
6. That at approximately 4:15 p.m. on said date, said 
Turner was arrested attempting to pass a second forged check 
drawn on the same account at 710 South 200 West; 
7. That Davis, Person, Barr and Carter were arrested a 
few minutes later in the second motor vehicle at approximately 
200 South 400 West and there were periods during those minutes 
when the second motor vehicle was not under police surveillance; 
8. That a search of all five individuals and both motor 
vehicles yielded no cash from either car; thirty-three cents in 
the possession of Barr; $3.97 in the possession of Slagowski; 
$11.95 in the possession of Carter; $151.09 in the possession 
of Person; and $277.38 in the possession of Davis, for a total 
of $444.62, which exceeded the amount received total by Turner 
Of $396.86 by $46.76; 
9. That all five individuals were arrested and 
prosecuted in a two-count Information, that Turner pled guilty, 
and that on February 3, 1986, the case against the other four 
individuals was dismissed pursuant to the State's motion, which 
recited "that the witnesses who observed criminal activity are 
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unable to make positive identification of said defendants, and 
that the State would not be able to meet its burden of proof 
with the evidence available at this time"; 
10. That Davis immediately requested the return of the 
money and no other person has made formal claim to the funds; 
11. That the prosecutor, James F. Housley, after 
consultation with the case detective, determined that the 
$277.38 seized from Davis was no longer "needed as evidence" 
within the meaning of §77-24-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and 
notified Defendant through his attorney that he was prepared to 
authorize the return of said property to Davis upon Hproof of 
ownership satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney*; 
12. That at a meeting held in the office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney on February 10, 1986. Davis presented a 
pre-prepared affidavit which has been marked as Exhibit "A" and 
attached hereto by reference, -and declined, upon advice of 
Counsel, to be questioned under oath concerning the manner in 
which he had come into possession of said money, and James 
Housley, the prosecutor, refused to authorize the return of the 
money to Davis, and that Davis did not sign a receipt prepared 
by James F. Housley. attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
13. That Counsel for Davis filed a Motion to Compel the 
Return of the Property under the criminal heading and noticed 
it up for hearing before the undersigned, to whom the criminal 
case had been assigned; 
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14. That after argument and submission of memoranda by 
both parties on the issue of whether a proceeding ancillary to 
the criminal case was a proper forum, as opposed to a separate 
civil proceeding, to determine whether the prosecutor under 
§77-24-2 had abused his discretion; 
15. That this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion, a 
photocopy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by 
reference made a part hereof; 
16. That on June 19. 1986. Davis and his attorney met 
with Housley in Housley1s office, and that Davis answered, 
under oath, questions regarding the sources of the $277.38 
seized from him at the time of his arrest. Davis1 testimony 
was that some of the funds were the result of auto detail work 
for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake auto paint shop, and that most 
of it came through a business arrangement he had with one Mike 
Garrity wherein they would sell property for Jack Bernel of 
Peddler's Pawn Shop. Eighth South 200 West, at swap meets and 
other places and receive a part of the proceeds; Davis 
explained that these two sources probably did not account for 
all of the monies; 
17. That Prosecutor Housley took the position that he 
was not going to authorize the return of said funds to Davis 
until forgery detective Jerry Campbell could verify or refute 
his allegations respecting it;. 
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18. That Davis* Counsel filed a Motion for an 
evidentiary hearing on July 15, 1986, which was scheduled for 
hearing on August 20, 1986; 
19. That at the August 20th hearing. Prosecutor Housley 
testified that he was not prepared to authorize the return of 
the money to Davis for the following reasons: 
a) That Detective Campbell had not been 
able to contact the persons mentioned by 
Davis in the June 19 meeting, and could not 
either confirm or refute what Davis had 
stated at said meeting; 
b) That the facts reflected in Findings 
numbered 1 through 8 above demonstrated to 
Housley that it was very likely that in the 
time between the receipt of the money by 
Turner and the arrest of all parties it 
would be extremely unlikely to dispose of 
the money received by Turner; and 
c) That Housley had been told by Counsel 
for Person during plea negotiations that 
Person and Barr had obtained the forged 
checks, recruited Turner to cash them, had 
given Turner half of the proceeds from the 
one check that she successfully cashed, and 
had not seen what Turner had done with her 
half of the proceeds; 
20. That at said hearing. Detective Campbell testified 
that he had made an effort a few days before the hearing to 
contact the individuals named by Mr. Davis without success, and 
that he had been unable to verify or refute Davis1 statements; 
21. That a record of all proceedings in this Court on 
Davis1 Motion to Compel the Return of Property has been made by 
State v. Davis 
Findings, Conclusion and Order 
Page 7 
the Court Reporter, and that the cost of preparing a transcript 
of said proceedings would be far in excess of the amount of 
money which is the subject of these proceedings. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. That an ancillary proceeding in the above-entitled 
criminal case is the appropriate forum for determination under 
§77-24-2. Utah Code Annotated 1953, whether or not the 
prosecuting attorney has abused his discretion in declining to 
authorize the return of property no longer needed in the 
prosecution of said criminal case to Davis; 
2. That the burden of establishing that the prosecuting 
attorney has thus abused his discretion is upon the claimant, 
in this case Davis, and that the standard of proof is by a 
preponderance of the evidence; 
3. That Davis has failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the prosecuting attorney abused his 
discretion in this case; and 
4. That proceedings ancillary to a criminal case to 
determine whether the prosecuting attorney has abused his 
discretion in declining to authorize the return of property no 
longer needed in a criminal prosecution under §77-24-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, is not the kind of a 
proceeding where the Court must or should require the State to 
bear the cost of preparing a transcript of such proceedings. 
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ORDER 
Based on said Findings and Conclusions, and good cause 
appearing therefor, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. That Davis* Motion to Compel the Return of Property 
be, and the same hereby is, denied; and 
2. That Davis1 Motion to Compel thy State to Bear the 
Cost of Transcribing the Record of these^ancillary proceedings 
be, and the same hereby is, denied. 
DATED this /o? day of May, 1 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^4^c-ula/ 
ct Judge 
Attorney for Defendant, Davis 
(Copy Received May // , 1987) 
( /rr^ Cc* % L\rxju^^s 1^ S/S&/?7 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Thomas E. Davis, am the lawful owner of the 
$277.00 taken from me at the time of my arrest. 
DATED this _ ^ _ ~ d a y of February, 1986. 
.9, 
THOMAS E. DAVIS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this (QI^- day 
of February, 1986. 
My Commission Expires: MOTARY PUBLIC j 
2-3-1-%% Residing in Stfit Lake City, Utah 
^4fi$i-r% tAM 
RECEIPT 
Received of James F. Housley, Deputy Salt Lake 
County Attorney, $277.?0 in currency seized! by the Salt Lake 
City Police Department in case # 84-96051. 
I swear that I am the owner, and entitled to 
possession of said property* 
Dated this /£/ day of February, 1986. 
{
-tt Carol/Nesset-Sale 
Attorney for Thomas Eugene Davi< 
Thomas Eugene Davis 
Atto g< 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
Februaryf 1986. 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY PUBLIC residing 
in Salt Lake County, Utah 
&J<{HArr <£» 
» — •••» wucnrv'j) OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN13 1986 
H. Dixon Hindley. Clerk 3rd Dist Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD q&DICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH DeputyC,er* 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI, GWENDOLYN 
CARTER HALL, THOMAS EUGENE 
DAVIS, CARL LINDELL BARR, and 




Before the Court is the defendant Davis' Motion to Compel 
the Return of Property. The Court has heard argument on the 
matter, and allowed the parties an opportunity to brief their 
respective positions. The Court has now received the briefs 
from the parties, and has considered the oral argument, together 
with the matters set forth in the Memorandums of law submitted, 
and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
In this case the defendant Davis seeks an Order from this 
Court compelling the County Attorney's Office to return monies 
in the amount of $277.43 that were apparently taken from Mr. Davis 
at the time of his arrest. The case against Mr. Davis was dismissed. 
Mr. Davis claims that he is the lawful owner of the money, and 
has done so by a brief Affidavit, dated February 6, 1936. The 
County Attorney on behalf of the State of Utah takes the position 
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t h a t they are e n t i t l e d t o inquire further of Mr. Davis beyond 
tiis Aff idavi t regarding h i s ownership of the funds in question , 
and have re fused t o return the above-mentioned monies to him. 
The County A t t o r n e y f s Office a lso takes the pos i t ion that any 
q u e s t i o n s regarding the propriety or lack thereof of refusing 
t o re turn the funds t o Mr. Davis should be c i v i l in nature, 
and t h i s Court does not have jur i sd ic t ion to resolve the matter 
in the criminal f i l e . 
The s ta tute that the part ies seek to have t h i s Court interpret 
as t o t h e i r respect ive pos i t ions i s Section 77-24-2 of the Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 as amended, vhich provides in substance that 
property vhich has been se ized incident to an arrest , and vhich 
i s no longer needed as evidence shal l be returned to the owner 
i f he may l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s i t . That s t a t u t o r y provis ion i s 
found in the Criminal Code promulgated by the l eg i s la ture , and 
t h i s Court determines that i t does have jur i sd ic t ion to review 
t h e s e matters as a re su l t of the criminal case f i l i n g , and i s 
n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o compel l ing the^ defendant t o bring a c i v i l 
a c t i o n t o recover h i s funds. Therefore, in a proper case the 
Court does and should exercise i t s jur i sd ic t ion , and order the 
return of property se ized at the arrest of a criminal defendant 
when the State l a t er dismisses the charges. 
The Court determines, however, that i t i s not the purpose 
of the s t a t u t e to place an absolute, non-reviewable discretion 
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•in t h e County At torney f s Of f i ce to determine whether or not 
property s e i z e d at the time of a r r e s t should be returned to 
a cr imina l defendant. The s ta tu te does, however, provide the 
County Attorney with c e r t a i n d iscret ion and authority to make 
reasonab le inquiry, i f not d i rec t ly by inference, into whether 
or not the defendant may "lawfully possess i t . , f The Affidavit 
submitted by defendant Davis i s inadequate in that regard, and 
h i s apparent refusal to comment further pursuant to the County 
A t t o r n e y f s ques t ions as t o h i s a c q u i s i t i o n of those funds i s 
e q u a l l y improper. I f the defendant Davis f e e l s that he can 
make no s tronger statement or exp la in further h i s claims to 
p o s s e s s i o n of the funds other than the conclusory statement 
t h a t he i s l awfu l ly e n t i t l e d t o p o s s e s s i t , then the County 
Attorney i s ent i t l ed to withhold the funds. 
Therefore the Court, based upon the s t a t e of the record 
a t the present t ime, den ies t h e Motion t o Compel the return 
of the $277.43. Should Mr. Davis be wi l l ing to answer reasonable 
q u e s t i o n s and other inquiry of the County Attorney's Office 
regarding h i s lawful right to the funds, then he may be entitled 
t o r e c e i v e those funds from the County Attorney. This Court 
i s of the opin ion , however, that should a dispute arise as to 
whether or not a sat is factory explanation has been made i s reviewable 
by t h i s Court in an appropriate ev ident iary hearing, i f such 
a recruest i s made. 
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The Salt Lake County Attorney*s Office is directed to prepare 
an Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit 
the same to the Court for review and signature in accordance 
with the Local Rules of Practice, 
Dated this /C dav of June, 1986. 
_M 
TIMOTHY R. HAHSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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